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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920732-CA 
v. : 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, : Priority No. 15 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Todd Allen Parker ("Parker") appeals a trial court 
order that denied his motion for return of money he paid for 
rehabilitative treatment. The treatment was ordered pursuant to 
Parker's burglary convictions, which were then reversed upon his 
original appeal, State v. Parker. 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992). 
The presently challenged order was entered by the Third District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, presiding. 
Parker asserts this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993) (appeals in criminal 
cases). However, as set forth in Point One of this brief, there 
is no subject matter properly before this Court, upon which it 
may exercise jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This appeal is more complex than it seems at first 
glance. A threshold issue, not previously identified by the 
parties, yet potentially dispositive, must be resolved before the 
issue framed by Parker may be addressed: 
1. Upon Appellate Remand for a New Trial, and 
Subsequent Dismissal of the Criminal Prosecution, Did the Trial 
Court Lose Jurisdiction Over the Question of Whether Any Money 
Spent by Parker Pursuant to his Original Conviction and Sentence 
Should be Returned to Him, Given that He Failed to Present that 
Question within Ten Days after the Order of Dismissal? This is a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction; on the pertinent 
uncontested facts, it is a question of law. Subject matter 
jurisdiction may be challenged on appeal, even if not challenged 
in the trial court. Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Utah App. 1987) (per curiam) (subject matter jurisdiction is the 
"fundamental and initial inquiry" of any court). 
2. When a Convicted Criminal Defendant Pays for 
Psychosocial Treatment, Pursuant to a Criminal Sentence, and the 
Underlying Conviction is then Reversed on Appeal for Fourth 
Amendment Error Unrelated to the Defendant's Factual Guilt, Is 
the Defendant then, if Not Re-Prosecuted, Entitled to Return of 
the Money He Paid for the Treatment? The State agrees that this 
issue, thus framed, is one of law or, more precisely, judicial 
policy, inasmuch as it obliges this Court to address the scope of 
the judicially-created exclusionary rule. Cf. State v. Vigil, 
815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah App. 1991) (addressing appellate 
court's role in guiding trial courts). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
 S T A T U T E S j^p RULES 
The threshold jurisdictional issue raised by the State 
i s c o n t r o l l e d bv P u l e M'f le'l 1PT1",I1I IRn \vfi I < i \ i I I'M I i i^ diiii 
a p p l i c a b l e In • c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s p u r s u a n t t o Utah R, Ci > Il" 
Ru le 59 (e ) p r o v i d e s : " A m o t i o n f;o a l t e r nr amend H I P \\ Il ,,,, -at 
s h a l l blip Rpi ("pill! in i lllirii I '"! i I i n i n l"'i\ !1,; <il t>"j, e n t r y ul. I.he 
3 udgmen t . " 
The issue presented by Parker is qoverned by ^  i,-> 
? « ( ' < ) , i »t "H hi i-'junles «i«l '« M I M ' I il Pi ' o c e d u i e R u l e 2!Mdl" ( f u J l y 
copied in Addendum A to Br. of Appellant) provides that wf-^ r. -
criminal, conviction is reversed "'ii appeal, Hii'l II, < n • I 
he hi .1 i if:11,eriaant. in custody shall be discharged, and a 
defendant restricted by hail or otherwise shall be released from 
restriction -r bail / M neraf. P«;I I i k(;uSjl i I lands ^ r 
property r e i . ^ u i to the proper person,1" See a.IsLo Utah ~; 
1" „•' S (d) i sub j ect t o except i ons not appl i cab] e 1 1:11 
i"']" i 111 la 1 ' I'I r 11 h mi II, j, dhcJ , " t: he defendant ulial i be 
discharged and bail exonerated") Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-, w - ^ . 
1393) (codifying Utah R. Crin ," Z"". (11! !m . 
S T A T E M E N T Q F T H E C A g E 
F I'm I'S statement of the case accurately recounts that 
mliih Court reversed bin burql ii i y m m ill IMIM , m i lu i ii | nihil 
mi I'lunpiice suppoitiny U M « convitLions had been obtained as \e 
result of an unconstitutional art eBf , See? State v, Pai ^. 
y.2U i>92 (TH.il. ^ Ml. . i I ' JU-'M-'I'1" " •• •», " Appellant 
remrii :l, I MU ed w i Lit suppression ot its key evidence, the State 
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decided to not reprosecute Parker. Therefore, the criminal case 
was dismissed (R. 52, copied in Appendix I of this brief). 
Parker subsequently moved for a refund of the fines he 
had paid pursuant to the convictions, along with fees that he had 
paid to the Fremont Community Correctional Center ("Fremont 
Center" or "Fremont"), a State-run, residential psychosocial 
treatment program. Parker was enrolled at Fremont while his 
original appeal was pending, pursuant to probation that was 
ordered upon the burglary convictions. At the State's 
stipulation, the trial court ordered the fines refunded to 
Parker, but denied his request for refund of the Fremont 
treatment fees (R. 59, copied in Addendum D of Br. of Appellant; 
R. 56, copied in Appendix II of this brief).1 Parker appeals 
the latter part of the order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parker's factual guilt of the September 1990 burglaries 
appears beyond dispute. As recounted in this Court's opinion in 
his original appeal, Parker confessed to the burglaries, and was 
positively identified by one of the burglary victims. On this 
powerful evidence, he was convicted at a bench trial. Parker, 
834 P.2d at 593. This Court reversed his convictions because the 
evidence, although compelling, was deemed to have been obtained 
as the result of an unconstitutional arrest. Id. at 595-96. 
xThe court did not address the restitution that was also 
ordered under the burglary convictions (the judgments, including 
the fines and restitution orders, copied in Parker's docketing 
statement to his original appeal, are recopied in Appendix I of 
this brief). Parker did not seek a refund of any restitution. 
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With respect; to h i s p resen t e f f o r t t o recover 
t i eaUiieril, h-itii.\ LJiul lie pajiJ In I lie,1 b\\ erm nil lenl .er undui 
subsequen t ly r eve r sed b u r g l a r y c o n v i c t i o n s , Parker ha- (Overlooked 
several, p e r t i n e n t fact?*,. T''irM « Ivile I lit- r v "iini nti I i 
] in j in Wi in!:!1 till ismisscci
 ( i o l I owing the a p p e l l a t e r e v e r s a l , x. i\ 
1992, P a r k e r ' s motion for lefund of the f i n e s and t r e a t s -
was not f i l e d u n t i l Auqnpl l'» I'n," (h i l .ipied 11 
t o Br. oil Appel lan t ) This f ac t should d i spose of t h i s appeal 
Next, p r e l i m i n a r y inqu i ry by the Utah At torney 
Gener'H I i\ o f f ice t'pved hi u J iupuLu aL u«m, Imw iniirl i i-'aiKei CKJIUH I J y 
pa id to the Fremont Center , Parker e v i d e n t l y a l l e g e s I h ml! In 
pa id $1620 00 t o Fremont {»$i80 pe r month for mm-" ir ! < . 
ol l\ppei .1 dii!! ciili 'II Il: J • J upon c o u n s e l ' s p ro t i e r a t K, \ i/opied 
i n Appendix II of t h i s b r i e f I I , and now d e s i r e s a "refund" of 
t h a t amount t o him Hownvpr Frftnn'ml of f i r i, a 1 *> afawtiI l,I ,il 
Parker was a s se s sed t e e s ol $ J ES4 8 , 00 and t h a t of t h i s amour1 \e 
s t i l l owes $401/7,1 {Jul) 29, 1993 A f f i d a v i t s of Vieki Harker 
I Fuel y Sathii i 11 H I ,ni I I a i, 11 I i,' x 11 i 111 I i.
 i(l i, i ip i ed i mi i i11 ppi:" rid I x 111 i 
brief; originals on file with the Utah Attorney General),2 
2The allidavits, not pi esently pa i: t of the record, ai e 
proffered to show a factual dispute, not to prove how much Parker 
actually paid to Fremont- Only if this Court wholly rejects the 
arguments set forth in this brief will the precise amount in 
controversy become central to this appeal. In that event, the 
proffer is made solely to demonstrate that the case should be 
remanded to the trial court for findings on the amount actually due 
to Parker Accordingly, it does not appear necessary, at this 
point, to supplement the record with the affidavits, under Utah R. 
App. P. 11. If this Court disagrees, the State hereby moves for 
such supplementation, for the above-described limited purpose on]y. 
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Finally, it appears that Parker advanced no motion for 
a certificate of probable cause, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 
(1990), pending his original appeal. If granted, such a motion 
might have enabled Parker to avoid any confinement while awaiting 
that appeal's outcome. Also, papers filed in this Court show 
that Parker's briefs in his original appeal were filed with 
thirty-day extensions requested by his counsel, each alleging 
that "Mr. Parker is not incarcerated." That allegation now 
appears questionable, at least with regard to the reply brief 
extension, apparently requested while Parker was residing at the 
Fremont Center.3 After this appeal, it may become necessary to 
determine how much Parker actually paid to Fremont, and of that 
amount, how much should be attributed to Parker's counsel, rather 
than solely to the State's decision to enroll Parker at Fremont. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Upon dismissal of the charges against Parker, and his 
failure to make any further requests within ten days after the 
order of dismissal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the 
criminal case. The trial court no longer had any criminal 
subject matter before it, upon which it could enter any order. 
This problem, overlooked by the parties and the trial court, yet 
properly raised for the first time on appeal, compels dismissal 
of this appeal. 
3That extension request was filed in this Court on January 3, 
1992. Fremont Center officials allege that Parker resided there 
from November 12, 1991 to July 31, 1992 (Harker Affidavit, Appendix 
III of this brief). 
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Such dismissal should be without prejudice to Parker's 
right to bring a civil action for the Fremont Center fees that he 
believes should be refunded to him, as a consequence of the post-
appeal dismissal of the criminal charges. However, such action 
seems doomed, because in it, Parker's factual guilt of the 
dismissed criminal charges will be admissible to show that he, 
not the State, proximately caused the monetary harm of which he 
will complain. 
Parker's request for a refund of the Fremont fees also 
raises a policy question regarding the scope of the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule. That rule, developed to deter 
police misconduct, barred Parker's criminal liability for crimes 
of which he is factually guilty. Pursuant to that bar, and under 
a reasonable construction of the pertinent criminal procedure 
rules, the punitive fine paid by Parker, before appellate 
application of the exclusionary rule, was properly refunded to 
him. That consequence advanced the police-deterrent purpose of 
the exclusionary rule. 
But a refund of the Fremont fees, accrued before 
Parker's convictions were reversed, is unsupported by precedent 
and would not deter police misconduct. Rather, it would deter 
prosecutorial and judicial leniency, as granted to Parker by the 
imposition of probation and rehabilitative efforts, rather than 
penal incarceration, upon his burglary convictions. Such 
expansion of the exclusionary rule's scope would also effectively 
reward Parker for his criminal activity, by allowing him to 
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retain, free of charge, the room, board, and rehabilitative 
services provided to him by Fremont. Parker ought not be 
unjustly enriched in such a manner. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED, BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE DISMISSED CRIMINAL 
CASE, UNDER WHICH PARKER FILED HIS MOTION FOR 
THE REFUND OF FINES AND FEES. 
A. Termination of Criminal Case on August 10, 1992. 
In his present appeal, Parker characterizes the trial 
court's post-appeal dismissal as a "sentence" that must be 
"corrected" (Br. of Appellant at 6). This is incorrect. Parker 
was only "sentenced" once, under his original convictions for the 
September 1990 burglaries. When this Court reversed those 
convictions in State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992), it 
also necessarily vacated the attendant sentences. 
Parker apparently views the original sentences as 
"illegal," or void at their inception, within the terms of Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e) (copied in Addendum A to Br. of Appellant). 
See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) (an 
illegal sentence is void). This, too, is incorrect. The term 
"illegal sentence," as used in Rule 22(e), applies to situations 
where the sentence does not conform to the crime of which the 
defendant has been convicted, or where the sentencing procedure 
itself was improper. E.g.. Montova (inquiring whether trial 
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court erred by not ordering a mental examination prior to 
sentencing). 
Parker does not argue that the three suspended, second 
degree felony sentences imposed upon him were out of conformity 
with his burglary convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(2) 
(1990) (burglary of a dwelling is a second degree felony).4 Nor 
does he argue that the sentencing proceeding that took place upon 
his original convictions was improper. 
Parker's sentences, then, were not "illegal" in any 
sense until this Court vacated them upon his original appeal. 
Were this not so, there would be no need to statutorily provide 
that a convicted defendant may apply for, and be granted, a 
certificate of probable cause that might allow release pending 
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990). Instead, a 
criminal conviction would never be final, and no sentence could 
be imposed upon the defendant, until an appeal is taken and 
decided. In this case, the trial court would have acted 
illegally if, upon the guilty verdicts, it had failed to sentence 
Parker. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (upon verdict, trial court 
"shall impose sentence"). Therefore, until his convictions were 
reversed by this Court, Parker stood legally sentenced. 
40n his initial appeal, Parker tacitly conceded that the three 
burglarized garages were "dwellings." But cf. State v. Cox, 826 
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992) (stating, in dictum, that garages 
are not "dwellings;" held, a vacation cabin is a "dwelling"). The 
garages burglarized by Parker were attached to houses, and the 
State's position at his original trial was that as such, they were 
a part of "dwellings" (T. 3/7/91 at 12, 39, 52, 123). 
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Upon that reversal, the sentences were vacated and the 
case of State v. Parker was remanded to the trial court, 834 P.2d 
at 596, preserving the State's option to retry Parker. Because 
this Court's application of the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule barred introduction of the evidence that proved Parker's 
factual guilt, the State did not retry him, and the criminal case 
was dismissed on July 31, 1992 (R. 52, Appendix I of this brief). 
That order of dismissal, of course, imposed no sentence 
whatsoever upon Parker. Instead, that order was, in essence, a 
final judgment that ended Parker's potential criminal liability 
for the burglaries. 
Attendant to that final judgment, the pertinent 
criminal procedure rules only required that Parker "be released 
from restriction and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or 
property refunded to the proper person." Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a); 
accord Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-7 (Supp. 
1993) (codifying Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d)). In fact, it appears 
that Parker was released from the Fremont Center, where he had 
been committed pursuant to his original convictions, on July 31, 
1992--the day that the judgment of dismissal was signed (R. 52; 
Harker Affidavit, Appendix III of this brief). Under the above-
cited rules, all other ongoing restrictions placed upon Parker by 
his probation terms also ended on July 31. 
Parker then had ten days, under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) 
(applicable to criminal proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e)), 
in which he could move to amend that judgment. In such motion, 
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Parker could request the refund, if appropriate, of any fines or 
fees that he had paid before his convictions were reversed, and 
before the State decided not to retry him. But Parker made no 
such motion. Therefore, on August 10, 1992, the criminal matter 
of State v. Parker was fully and irretrievably concluded. 
It follows that on August 10, 1992, the trial court 
lost subject matter jurisdiction over the case. This conclusion 
logically flows from the law that governs what would have 
happened if Parker had been successfully reprosecuted following 
his original appeal. Under such circumstances the trial court, 
after imposing a new sentence upon Parker, would have again lost 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case, except to correct any 
legal error in the new sentence. Montova, 825 P.2d at 679. 
Because the dismissal order that was entered imposed no sentence, 
and because that order stood unchallenged until after the time to 
amend it had passed, the trial court lost all subject matter 
jurisdiction over State v. Parker. Put differently, the case 
simply ceased to exist. 
Accordingly, Parker's August 19, 1992 motion for the 
return of fines and fees, under the heading of State v. Parker, 
had no legal effect, because it was filed under a nonexistent 
case. The trial court should have denied or "dismissed" what 
was, in effect, a free-floating motion. See Thompson v. Jackson. 
743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) (per curiam) (subject matter 
jurisdiction is n[t]he fundamental and initial inquiry" of a 
court). Nor was the subject matter of State v. Parker 
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resurrected by the State's in-court response to Parker's motion 
(R. 73, 76, Appendix II of this brief): "Unlike a court's 
exercise of jurisdiction over a person or a party, subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be created or conferred on the court by 
consent or waiver." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1232. 
Because the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over Parker's free-floating motion, even its order 
refunding the fines paid by Parker, pursuant to the reversed 
convictions, is void. Technically, the State could demand that 
Parker pay back the fines, which evidently were refunded to him 
(R. 57, copied in Appendix II of this brief). The State will 
make no such demand.5 Nevertheless, because the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to even consider either the 
return of the fines or the return of the treatment fees Parker 
paid to the Fremont Center, this Court's only proper action is to 
dismiss Parker's present appeal. Montoya. 825 P.2d at 681; 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1232-33. 
Such disposition may, at first, seem technical and 
unfairly arbitrary. Upon careful reflection, it is not. Under 
statutes of limitation, nearly every manner of civil and criminal 
wrong becomes legally irremediable if judicial action is not 
5As set forth under Point Two of this brief, Utah R. Crim. P. 
28(a) may be construed to include a fine as a "deposit," returnable 
to a defendant who is not reprosecuted following a successful 
appeal. Under such construction and in the interest of fairness, 
Parker would have legitimately recouped the fine that he paid, had 
he timely requested it. Accordingly, no good purpose would be 
served by demanding that Parker now return the fine because of the 
jurisdictional error through which he recouped it. 
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instituted in timely fashion. E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1 
through -33.5 (1992 & Supp. 1993) (civil actions); §§ 76-1-302, 
-303 (Supp. 1993) (most criminal prosecutions). All such limits 
have an element of arbitrariness, but "when it is seen that a 
line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or 
logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision . . . must be 
accepted unless we can say it is very wide of any reasonable 
mark-" Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 
48 S. Ct. 423, 426 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted in 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 401-02 (Utah 1989)). 
The ten-day time, fixed by Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e), in 
which Parker might have sought to amend the order dismissing his 
criminal charges, to include the return of fines and fees to him, 
cannot be assailed as "wide of any reasonable mark." Parker will 
probably argue that his motion to return the fines and fees was 
reasonably timely, given that he filed it only nineteen days 
after the criminal charges were dismissed. That argument, 
applied only to this particular case, seems persuasive enough. 
But if Parker prevails under a "reasonableness"-based 
expansion of subject matter jurisdiction in this case, who can 
then deny some other former criminal defendant twenty days, 
thirty days, or several months or years, to advance some similar 
request? With no clearly fixed limit in which to do so, any 
number of such former defendants may wish to reopen their cases, 
to recoup damages they may allege as a consequence of criminal 
charges that were dismissed long ago. 
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In the interest of stability, predictability, and 
finality of dismissed criminal actions, the only proper response 
is to hold a firm line under the rules as they are written. 
Accordingly, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this appeal 
must be dismissed. 
B. Parker Mav Seek the Refund Via a Civil Action. 
Such dismissal will not, however, automatically bar 
Parker from attempting to remedy the wrong that he now alleges. 
The dismissal of this appeal should be without prejudice to 
Parker's right to file a civil complaint, if he so wishes, 
seeking recovery of the fees he paid to Fremont. See Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12 (Utah courts are open for "any civil cause"). The 
State comments, however, that such action appears likely to fail. 
In his prospective civil action, Parker will presumably 
complain that he was monetarily damaged by his unconstitutional 
treatment at the hands of the officers who arrested him. See 
State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992). The officers did 
not directly harm Parker. Rather, the arrest led to Parker's 
burglary convictions which, under the resulting sentences, caused 
him to accrue fees at the Fremont Center. Those fees, Parker 
will allege, represent his damages. 
Given these facts, the prospective defendants will 
argue that Parker himself caused his damages. He was, after all, 
factually guilty of the September 1990 burglaries, even though, 
as a result of his original appeal, his prosecution turned out to 
be legally barred by the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See 
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State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988) (despite 
factual guilt, legal error in the seizure of evidence may bar 
successful criminal prosecution). 
Other appellate courts have held that when a former 
criminal defendant seeks civil damages under such circumstances, 
evidence that was suppressed in the prior criminal action is 
admissible for the former prosecuting entity's civil defense. 
See McDaniel v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash. App. 360, 828 P.2d 81 
(1992) (former criminal defendant's civil complaint for police 
tort; evidence of former defendant's actual criminal conduct 
admissible), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1020, 844 P.2d 1017 
(1993); Herndon v. Ithaca, 349 N.Y.S.2d 227, 43 A.D.2d 634 (1973) 
(same). Thus in his prospective civil action, Parker's factual 
guilt of burglary will be admissible for the purpose of showing 
that he, not the State or any other possible defendants, 
proximately caused the damage of which he will complain. 
POINT TWO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES 
NOT RELIEVE PARKER FROM FEES HE ACCRUED FOR 
REHABILITATIVE SERVICES BEFORE THE DISMISSAL, 
UPON HIS ORIGINAL APPEAL, OF THE CRIMINAL 
CHARGES AGAINST HIM. 
Although the present appeal must be dismissed, Parker's 
prospective civil action to recover the treatment fees paid to 
the Fremont Center will also present a judicial policy issue 
regarding the scope of the exclusionary rule remedy for police 
violations of the fourth amendment. In the event this Court 
might reject the jurisdictional bar explained in Point One of 
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this brief, that issue becomes central to the present appeal. In 
either event, it is appropriate to address it now. 
On the merits of his claim for the refund of money 
spent pursuant to his subsequently vacated burglary sentences, 
Parker has a strong argument for a refund of the fines that he 
paid. That argument is technically moot, given that the Parker 
has already recouped the fines, and the State has no intention of 
demanding that Parker return them. The State observes, however, 
that Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a) can be reasonably stretched to 
construe a fine, imposed for purely punitive purposes, as a 
"deposit," refundable to Parker upon the post-appeal dismissal of 
the burglary charges. See United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835 
(5th Cir. 1973), and State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 545, 
410 P.2d 502 (1966) (fines, imposed upon criminal convictions, 
were properly refunded when convictions were subsequently set 
aside) (cited in Br. of Appellant at 7, 8). 
But the fees paid by Parker to the Fremont Center, 
before his sentences were vacated, are of a wholly different 
nature. Those fees had no punitive purpose, but were paid for 
room, board, and psychosocial treatment, with the purpose of 
rehabilitating Parker. Indeed, through counsel at his original 
sentencing, Parker acknowledged his need for rehabilitation, 
challenging only the length of the proposed Fremont Center stay 
(R. 81-86, copied in Appendix III of this brief)• 
As Parker properly acknowledges (Br. of Appellant at 
5), no precedent squarely holds that rehabilitative service fees 
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must be refunded when a criminal conviction is reversed on 
appeal, and court-ordered rehabilitation efforts are thereby 
terminated. The cases cited by Parker to support such a rule 
(Br. of Appellant at 6-9) are far off-point. As already noted, 
Lewis and State v. Superior Court involve the return of fines, 
not rehabilitation fees. The cases otherwise involve the 
unconstitutionality or misinterpretation of statutes that defined 
the charged crimes, e.g.. Lewis, Ex parte McCurley, 412 So. 2d 
1236 (Ala. 1982), State v. Piekkola. 241 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1976), 
and People v. Meverowitz, 61 111. 2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1 (1975); 
error in imposition or amount of fines for particular offenses, 
e.a.^Mossew v. United States, 266 F. 18 (2nd Cir. 1920), State v. 
Danielson, 809 P.2d 937 (Alaska App. 1991), and State v. Stein, 
806 P.2d 346 (Alaska App. 1991); and imposition of a fine beyond 
the amount jurisdictionally permitted to the sentencing court, 
People v. Reqqel, 28 P. 955 (Utah 1892). Finally, without 
meaningful analysis, and admitting that he did not brief the 
issue in the trial court, Parker argues that state constitutional 
"due process" entitles him to a refund of the fees he paid to the 
Fremont Center (Br. of Appellant at 9-11). 
Absent on-point authority or preserved, meaningful 
analysis, this Court should not create the unprecedented rule 
urged by Parker. Such a rule would expand the scope of the 
exclusionary rule well beyond its primary purpose--the deterrence 
of police misconduct. See United States v. Janis. 428 U.S. 433, 
446, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3028 (1976) (police deterrence is the "prime 
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purpose" of the exclusionary rule, "if not the sole one"); 
McDaniel v. Citv of Seattle. 65 Wash. App. 360, 828 P.2d 81, 83-
85 (1992) (citing Janis and other United States Supreme Court 
limitations of the exclusionary rule to its police-deterrent 
purpose), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1020, 844 P.2d 1017 (1993). 
The termination of Parker's criminal liability and the issuance 
of this Court's published opinion, spelling out the police errors 
in Parker's September 1990 arrest, have adecjuately advanced the 
exclusionary rule's proper purpose. 
If it is now held that Parker is entitled to a refund 
of the Fremont Center fees, this Court would actually punish 
prosecutorial and judicial conduct that was never subject to 
police control, and that should be supported, not deterred. At 
sentencing, Parker sought leniency because of his relatively 
clean prior criminal history. Through counsel, he expressed a 
desire undergo rehabilitation that would include gainful 
employment, counselling, and attainment of a high school 
equivalency diploma. The prosecutor agreed that this was 
appropriate (R. 81-86, Appendix III of this brief). The trial 
court, in its virtually unfettered sentencing discretion, see 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991), therefore 
ordered rehabilitative probation, rather than imprisonment. 
If the rehabilitative fees paid by Parker now must be 
refunded to him, prosecutors and trial courts in future, similar 
situations will be encouraged to exercise their discretion 
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against such leniency and rehabilitative efforts- Rather, they 
will simply sentence the convicted defendant to prison. 
If the defendant then obtains appellate reversal and is 
not reprosecuted, he or she will be entitled only to release from 
prison; further relief would be due only upon proof of actual 
damages. See Miller v. Cox. 443 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(absent authorizing legislation, prisoner released upon 
invalidation of sentence is not entitled to compensation for time 
served);6 Logan v. Superintendent, Virginia. 389 F. Supp. 1242, 
1243 (E.D. Va. 1975) (no compensation, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
for time served pursuant to a subsequently voided conviction). 
Parker's argument for refund of his Fremont Center fees therefore 
promotes the exercise of sentencing discretion in a way that will 
harm future, similarly-situated criminal defendants: To avoid 
extra expense upon successful appeals, such defendants will, upon 
conviction, simply be sent straightaway to prison, rather than 
placed upon rehabilitative probation. 
Parker's argument can also be perceived as an effort at 
overreaching. It is difficult to imagine that the $180.00 per 
month charged by Fremont to Parker would cover the actual cost of 
his room and board, much less the cost of the counselling and 
vocational rehabilitation services provided to him (R. 81-83; see 
also Harker Affidavit, Appendix III of this brief). Thus 
6The Miller opinion goes on to observe that any legislative 
scheme for such compensation would consider "whether the prisoner 
was in fact guilty . . . .n 443 F.2d at 1021. Parker's factual 
guilt of burglary would therefore most likely preclude any recovery 
for punishment already endured by him. 
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pursuant to his original, rehabilitation-oriented sentence, 
Parker received benefits worth far more than the fees assessed to 
him. Now Parker demands a further benefit, beyond the heavily-
subsidized Fremont Center services: he wants the State, in 
effect, to actually pay him for receiving those services. 
That audacious demand should be rejected. The State 
has already suffered the consequence that, because of fourth 
amendment error in his arrest, Parker must elude full liability 
for the burglaries that he committed. Acquiescence in Parker's 
demand for refund of the Fremont fees would allow him to profit 
from the burglaries, albeit in a manner different from what he 
must have contemplated when he committed them. This would amount 
to Parker's unjust enrichment--a result not commanded by the 
exclusionary rule, nor by any constitutional principle. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Point One of this brief, this appeal 
should be dismissed, permitting Parker, should he so desire, to 
seek a civil remedy for the wrong that he now alleges. If the 
merits of his exclusionary rule-based claim are reached, however, 
that claim, as set forth in Point Two, should be rejected. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 03> day of September, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
y 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TODD PARKER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 901901633FS 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter be 
dismissed. This dismissal is based on the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in State v. Parker, 189 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Ct. of 
App., 1992) in which that court reversed this court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress and ordered the state's evidence be 
suppressed. 
DATED this day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
ONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
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{COMMITMENT) 
<jOl 96/633 
fcg (fiftfrrT% )". 
XL. 
A&J.Kf S 
m ffl./ffiW/' 
O The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is O granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted by D a jury; Vthe court; O plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of jPuAavrtAiA a felony 
of the i>7- degree, D a clasp misdemeanor, beiri^aow preserfljn court and ready for sentence and 
represented by ^V. uPAGQfo} and the State being represented by n
 T SptjCfCL is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Priso >n? 
O to a maximum mandatory term of. , years and which may be for life; 
O not to exceed five years; 
«^>f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed, . years; 
^ t f and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $jOt(Y^ 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
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O such sentence is to run consecutively with 
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E^P Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) se t nce and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and MP4*r the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of ( o MlC7\^jt\S , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
O Commitment shall issue ^ 
DATED this. 
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Defense Counsel 
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D Submit to drug testing. 
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O Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
O Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
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O Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
O Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RETURN FINES & 
FEES 
CASE NO. 901901633 FS 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 28TH DAY OF AUGUST. 
1992. COMMENCING IN THE A.M. CRIMINAL CALENDAR, THE ABOVE 
-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE 
COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 
SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
TOM VUYK. ESQUIRE. DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 531-4132 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
LISA J. REMAL. ESQUIRE. SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, 424 BAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111 TELEPHONE 532-5444 APPEARING WITH AND ON BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
FILED ESTRHGT COURT 
I ft • ft g Third Judicial District 
- - i y ; r « f i
 t _ NOV301992 
35 
SAL/LAKE COUNTY 
1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
2 IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE DEFENDANT:) 
3 THE COURT: STATE VERSUS TODD ALLEN PARKER. 
4 MS. REMAL: LISA REMAL ON BEHALF OF MR. PARKER 
5 WHO IS PRESENT. 
6 THE COURT: THIS IS YOUR MOTION, COUNSEL? 
7 MS. REMAL: IT IS, YOUR HONOR. IT'S OUR MOTION 
8 FOR RETURN OF FINES, COSTS AND FEES TO MR. PARKER. YOUR 
9 HONOR, THIS IS A MATTER IN WHICH TRIAL WAS HELD, APPEAL WAS 
10 TAKEN TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
11 REVERSED THE CONVICTION AND REMANDED THE CASE FOR FURTHER 
12 PROCEEDINGS. 
13 AND ON JULY 31, 1992, THE CASE WAS DISMISSED BY 
14 YOUR HONOR IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' 
15 DECISION HAD BASICALLY SUPPRESSED THE STATE'S EVIDENCE. 
16 MR. PARKER, IN THE INTERIM, WHILE THE CASE WAS 
17 PENDING ON APPEAL, HAS BEEN ON PROBATION PAYING FINES, COSTS 
18 AND FEES, AND IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN PAYING FEES TO THE 
19 FREEMONT PROGRAM WHERE HE WAS PART OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
20 STRUCTURE PROGRAM. 
21 IT IS OUR MOTION THAT NOW THAT THERE IS NO 
22 CONVICTION UPON WHICH TO BASE ANY IMPOSITION OF FINES AND FEES 
23 AND COSTS, THAT ALL FINES, FEES AND COSTS PAID BY MR. PARKER 
24 DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND PRIOR TO DISMISSAL OF 
25 THE CASE BE RETURNED TO HIM, AND I THINK WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A 
0072 
1 FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY. 
2 MR. PARKER INDICATED TO ME HE PAID 
3 APPROXIMATELY $900 IN FINES, AND HE'S PAID $180 PER MONTH TO 
4 THE FREEMONT PROGRAM, AND HE WAS A RESIDENT THERE FOR NINE 
5 MONTHS. SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THAT AMOUNT OF MONEY AS WELL, 
6 YOUR HONOR. 
7 MR. VUYK: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD THINK WHILE HE 
8 WAS IN THE FREEMONT CENTER, THAT WENT TO PART OF HIS OWN 
9 MAINTENANCE WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT'S THERE. I HAVE NO 
10 KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER FINES OR FEES, AND AM SIMPLY GOING TO 
11 SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS. 
12 THE COURT: THE COURT WON'T ACCEPT THAT. THE 
13 COURT WON'T ACT ON THIS UNTIL THE COUNTY ATTORNEY TAKES A 
14 POSITION ON IT. IF IT HAS TO BE CONTINUED, IT WILL, BUT I'LL 
15 EXPECT THE COUNTY ATTORNEY TO TAKE A POSITION AS FAR AS WHAT 
16 THE FINES AND FEES SHOULD BE, AND WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE 
17 RETURNED. 
18 MR. VUYK: I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE AS TO 
19 WHETHER THAT SHOULD BE DONE OR NOT. CAN IT BE CONTINUED ONE 
20 WEEK? 
21 THE COURT: THAT WILL BE THE ORDER. 
22 (WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
23 
24 (TRANSCRIBED BY NANCY BURR) 
25 
3 
r\ #%••• f\ 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EDWARD P. MIDGLEY, RPR, CM, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES 
HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WERE BY ME SUBSEQUENTLY 
CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM, CONSISTING OF 
PAGES 1 THROUGH 3, BOTH INCLUSIVE; AND THAT SAID 
TRANSCRIPTION SO PRODUCED CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
AND NOTARIAL SEAL THIS 24TH DAY OP NOVEMBER, 1992, AT SALT 
LAKE CITY. 
EDWARD P. MIDGLEY", RPR,-CM 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 133) 
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FILED WSTiWCtc*3T 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D l l f f i W 1 0 ' 8 1 D'^ "C t 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH NOV 3 0 1992 
&t£ptKECOUN*i 
STATE OF UTAH, : By HU4l 'AAifov 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OP 
PLAINTIFF, : HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RETURN FINES & 
FEES VS. 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, 
DEFENDANT. 
Deputwtrk 
CASE NO. 901901633 FS 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 15TH DAY OF 
SEPTEMBER. 1992. COMMENCING IN THE A.M. CRIMINAL CALENDAR, THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF 
THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 
SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
JOHN SPIKES. ESQUIRE. DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 531-4140 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
LISA J. REMAL. ESQUIRE. SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, 424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111 TELEPHONE 532-5444 APPEARING WITH AND ON BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
ORIGINAL 
FILED 
rre 
1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
2 IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE DEFENDANT:) 
3 THE COURT: STATE VERSUS TODD ALLEN PARKER. 
4 MS. REMAL*. LISA REMAL ON BEHALF OF MR. PARKER. 
5 MR. SPIKES: JOHN SPIKES FOR THE STATE, TOUR 
6 HONOR. 
7 THE COURT: THE MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT 
8 FOR WHAT, COUNSEL? 
9 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS A MOTION FOR 
10 RETURN OF FINES, COSTS AND FEES. 
11 THE COURT: THIS WAS BEFORE THE COURT ON 
12 ANOTHER OCCASION. THE STATE WAS GOING TO LOOK INTO THIS. 
13 WHAT'S YOUR DECISION, MR. SPIKES? 
14 MR. SPIKES: YOUR HONOR, I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH 
15 WHERE THINGS STAND IN THE CASE. 
16 THE COURT: THE COURT IS GOING TO MAKE THIS 
17 RULING: THE COURT IS GOING TO GIVE THE STATE UNTIL 2 O'CLOCK 
18 THIS AFTERNOON TO MAKE SOME DECISION ON THIS AND GET BACK TO 
19 THE COURT. IF THE STATE FAILS TO DO SO, THEN YOUR MOTION IS 
20 GRANTED. IF THEY GET BACK WITH SOMETHING, THEN THE COURT WILL 
21 CONSIDER IT. 
22 MS. REMAL: FOR THE RECORD, LET ME INDICATE 
23 THAT ALTHOUGH MY MOTION STATES GROUNDS THAT ARE IN THE 
24 INTEREST OF JUSTICE, I WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT ORALLY THAT 
25 IN ADDITION TO THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE I BELIEVE THAT BOTH 
2 
1 FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED IN THE RIGHT 
2 TO NOT HAVE TOUR PROPERTY DEPRIVED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
3 MR. PARKER'S CONVICTION WAS REVERSED BT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
4 AND THE CASE IS NOW DISMISSED, AND I BELIEVE HE'S ENTITLED TO 
5 THE RETURN OF ALL FINES HE'S PAID PLUS ALL COSTS AND FEES, 
6 INCLUDING COSTS OF HIS STAT AT THE HALFWAT HOUSE BECAUSE THERE-
7 IS NO LONGER ANT BASIS FOR THAT DEPRIVATION. 
8 THE COURT: THANK TOU, COUNSEL. 
9 (WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 (TRANSCRIBED BT NANCT BURR) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EDWARD P. MIDGLEY, RPR, CM, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES 
HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WERE BY ME SUBSEQUENTLY 
CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM, CONSISTING OF 
PAGES 1 THROUGH 3, BOTH INCLUSIVE; AND THAT SAID 
TRANSCRIPTION SO PRODUCED CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
AND NOTARIAL SEAL THIS 24TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1992, AT SALT 
LAKE CITY. 
EDWARD P. MIDGLEY, RPR, CM 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 133) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
PARKER, TODD ALLEN 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 901901633 FS 
DATE 09/15/92 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER ED MIDGLEY 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. SPIKES, JOHN 
D. ATTY. REMAL, LISA J 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RETURN FINES AND FEES COMES NOW ON 
REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING, APPEARANCES AS SHOWN 
ABOVE. WHEREUPON, AFTER CONSIDERATION FROM THE STATE, THEY 
WILL STIPULATE TO RETURN THE FINES, BUT OBJECT TO ANY MONIES 
RETURNED FOR REHABILITATION. THE COURT SO ORDERS. 
CC: LDA LISA REMAL 
nnc;c 
4 . . . \ -> 5 - W mm 
SEP 2 £ 1392 
W&fo ©{strict Court »Afc.l ,Nir iy-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
$jz6 ^ tjfcl 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
'/rt/J ri.f>&Ju* 
Defendant. 
RECEIPT 
CASE NO. 30±2£±C,2Z 
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF CHECK NO., /toy . IN THE SUM OF $ '7j> 0< . 
Date 
By. 
240 East 400 South / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-535-5581 
0057 
APPENDIX III 
Original Sentencing Hearing 
Affidavits of Vicki Harker and Judy Sahm (Fremont Center) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 901901633 FS 
Transcript of: 
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Friday, April 5, 1991 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
JOHN N. SPIKES 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Ofc. 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES BRADSHAW 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 801-535-5470 ^ ^ /^*^s 
Tnird Judicial District 
HAR l 7 1993 
.T LAKE COUNTY 
1 FRIDAY, APRIL 5 , 1991J A.M. SESSION 
2 S E N T E N C I N G P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 THE COURT: State of Utah versus Todd Allen Parker. 
5 I This is the time set for sentencing, counsel. Any 
6 I legal reason why sentence should not be imposed? 
7 MR. BRADSHAW: There is none, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
9 I MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, I hope the Court recalls 
10 this case. Just by way of refreshing your recollection, it 
11 was a case that Mr. Blaylock and I tried before your Honor, a 
12 bench trial, where Mr. Parker was accused of breaking into 
13 three garages and stealing a flashlight. 
14 THE COURT: I do recall. 
15 MR. BRADSHAW: We went through the trial. And the 
16 only reason we went through the trial, as the Court was 
17 aware, was to preserve the Motion to Suppress. The State had 
18 offered to allow the defendant to plead guilty to a Third 
19 Degree Felony but would not allow him to do that if he wanted 
20 I to preserve his right to appeal. In other words, if he 
21 wanted to do a conditional plea and preserve his right to 
22 I appeal the Motion to Suppress, they were not willing to give 
23 a Third Degree Felony. 
24 I But I offer that by way of background because I am 
25 I going to ask the Court to do what the State refused to do, 
1 and that is to reduce these convictions one degree to a Third 
2 Degree Felony pursuant to 76-3-402. And I submit to the 
3 Court that a defendant's conviction, whether it be a Second 
4 or Third, should not be based upon the fact that they attempt 
5 to preserve their constitutionally guaranteed rights. That 
6 is simply not a basis to deny someone the benefit of good 
7 I faith negotiation. And the State was clearly willing to give 
8 this defendant a Third Degree Felony if he gave up his right 
9 to contest his search and seizure. And if he contested that, 
10 then somehow he waived that. 
11 I think that's inappropriate. And I think it is 
12 in the interest of justice, which is the language of 
13 76-3-402, to reduce this one degree to a Third Degree Felony 
14 and sentence the defendant accordingly on a Third Degree 
15 I Felony. 
16 I He is still not getting the benefit as he would 
17 before because he is sentenced on Third Degree Felonies 
18 I rather than one Third Degree Felony which was an offer if he 
19 I was willing to give up his constitutional right. And I would 
20 I ask the Court to reduce it one degree. 
21 I In regards to the sentence, the recommendation in 
22 I the Report is that the defendant go to Fremont. And I really 
23 I don't have a strong objection to the recommendations, and I 
24 I think they reflect that Mr. Parker is excellent on the 
25 I Criminal History Assessment, that he didn't have an extensive 
1 prior record. 
2 I Mr. Parker and I talked about Fremont. That's a 
3 I long program and it may be a little severe for someone with 
4 I his prior history, for someone who is excellent. That's a 
5 I year long — it's a residential year long. He has to live 
6 I there for at least a year. That is a bit excessive. 
7 I I think he needs probation and vocational rehab, 
8 which is one of the things that Fremont is going to give him. 
9 He needs to be on formal probation, and the Probation 
10 Department reflects that. But I think that this one year 
11 program is a bit excessive given the nature of this offense 
12 and the nature of his prior record. So I would ask the Court 
13 I to impose all the conditions of probation save that first one 
14 to the Community Correction Center. 
15 THE COURT: What are you proposing in place of 
16 that? 
17 I MR. BRADSHAW: That he be placed on probation to 
18 Adult Probation & Parole. As a condition of his probation he 
19 I receive vocational rehabilitation, that he undergo any and 
20 all mental health counseling that's ordered by Adult 
21 I Probation & Parole, basically any counseling that they deem 
22 I appropriate -- out-patient, anything of that nature ~ and 
23 I the other conditions that are listed as terms and conditions 
24 I of his probation. 
25 I MR. SPIKES: Your Honor, as Mr. Bradshaw has 
indicated, this is Mr. Blaylock's case. The information I 
have would indicate to me that it would be inappropriate for 
the State to go along with any sort of motion to reduce. The 
matter came for trial before the Court. And the Court 
convicted Mr. Parker of the Second Degree Felonies, and we 
would ask that the Court sentence him appropriately. 
Apparently there was some discussions concerning a 
plea bargain. Whatever took place broke down and the matter 
went to trial. That's what's in front of the Court. 
Mr. Blaylock's notes do indicate that it would be 
appropriate to submit it on the information contained in the 
Presentence Report. I think Fremont is a good program. It's 
got some structure and it would be good for Mr. Parker to go 
into the Fremont program and let him do that, and I ask the 
Court to direct him to complete the program. 
THE COURT: What is your opinion as far as the 
Fremont program being an overkill, as he indicated? 
MR. SPIKES: I don't believe that's the case. I 
think the Fremont program has a lot of flexibility. They 
release people to pursue employment. If that's appropriate 
for Mr. Parker, I'm sure they would make those 
determinations• 
MR. BRADSHAW: I called today because I had some 
concerns and they indicated that it would probably be at 
least a year and perhaps longer. Some people are in Fremont 
as long as two years. It's an in-depth program. There is no 
question about that. 
THE COURT: Anything you wish to state, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, the Court does sentence the 
defendant, Todd Allen Parker, for the crime of Burglary of a 
Dwelling, being a Second Degree Felony, to incarceration at 
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 
years and a fine of $10,000. The Court does stay the 
execution of the prison sentence and the fine and places the 
defendant on probation to the Adult Parole and Probation 
Department for a period of 18 months, or such shorter or 
longer time as they may recommend to this Court. He is to 
comply with all rules, conditions and regulations which they 
may impose upon him. 
As further condition of the probation the Court 
does order that the defendant be responsible for — jointly 
and severally responsible for full restitution in this 
matter* 
That the Court would further order that the 
defendant - I am further ordering that the Probation 
Department during the period of probation between now and 
June 11th assess this individual and make a determination as 
to whether they recommend the Fremont Center for him or 
another program which they feel would be as good or better 
nnnnjl 
1 for him. That if the Probation Department is of the opinion 
2 I that other programs are as good or better, then he may be 
3 placed in that particular program. If the matter needs to be 
4 I brought back before the Court, it can. That the Court will 
5 I give discretion to the Probation Department to make that 
6 I decision if they see fit. 
7 I If counsel for the defendant wishes to bring it 
8 back before the Court prior to the June 11th date that he can 
9 go into the Fremont Center, then of course he may do so. But 
10 I would ask that to be brought back before the Court at least 
11 I two weeks prior to that date so that the Fremont Center does 
12 I know where they are going on it. So what I am saying at this 
13 I time is that he is to be placed in Fremont, but the 
14 discretion is with the Probation Department to look at that 
15 I and make further recommendation to the Court as they see fit, 
16 and counsel has the right to participate in that. 
17 The Court would further order that the defendant 
18 I pay a fine of $800 plus a 25 percent surcharge. However, the 
19 I Court will allow him to work this off as the Probation 
20 I Department has recommended, and they recommended at this 
21 point at $5 per hour. The Court would allow that and any 
22 I other further recommendations that the Probation Department 
23 may recommend as far as working that off. 
24 I The Court would further order that during the 
25 course of the probation that the defendant enter into and 
1 complete his high school education, obtain his GED education. 
2 That the Court would allow the Probation Department to work 
3 I this in with that fine and allow school time to be placed as 
4 a way to work off the fine and alot to that a certain amount 
5 I of hours as far as the school is concerned. 
6 I The Court would further order that the defendant 
7 I enter into and participate and complete any type of 
8 psychological evaluation through the forensic unit of the 
9 Salt Lake County Mental Health or participate in any other 
10 type of rehabilitation counseling, mental health program the 
11 I Probation Department may recommend for him. 
12 The Court would further order that — the Court 
13 would deny the defendant's request at this time to reduce 
14 this matter pursuant to Section 76-3-402. However, I would 
15 I grant to the defendant the right pursuant to that section to 
16 I bring this matter back up at the end of the probation. And 
17 if the probation has been successfully completed, and that 
18 would include the obtaining of a GED education, that the 
19 I Court would then consider that motion and would be looking 
20 favorably upon it. However, I would not make a decision at 
21 this time. 
22 MR. BRADSHAH: We would ask that there be a 
23 notation in the file that the Court would consider it at the 
24 end of probation. 
25 THE COURT: It's in the record. And you may place 
1 I it in any motion you want to* 
2 1 I am informed by the clerk that we have three 
3 count8 on this gentleman* 
4 1 MR. BRADSHAW: There are three counts, your Honor. 
5 I And I would specifically request in regards to the finding, 
6 that if he is going to be at Fremont and there for a year, 
7 which I think is a distinct possibility at this point, $800 
8 I is excessive, and triple that would be most excessive* 
9 THE COURT: I didn't say triple it. 
10 I MR. BRADSHAW: I don't want to put words in your 
11 mouth. 
12 THE COURT: He does have two other Counts of Second 
13 Degrees? 
14 MR. BRADSHAW: Right. 
15 THE COURT: The Court also sentences the defendant, 
16 Todd Allen Parker, for the crime of Burglary of a Dwelling, 
17 I being a Second Degree Felony, to incarceration at the Utah 
18 I State Prison for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years and 
19 I fine of $10,000. The Court also sentences the defendant, 
20 Todd Allen Parker, for the crime of Burglary of a Dwelling, 
21 I being a Second Degree Felony, to incarceration at the Utah 
22 I State Prison for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years and a 
23 fine of $10,000. 
24 And the Court does stay the execution of all 
25 prison sentences and fines and orders that they run 
1 I concurrent, and orders that he be on probation under the same 
2 terms and conditions as stated previously by the Court. 
3 Now, I'm not sure what Section 76 says 
4 J concerning ~ and maybe you are not pursuing anything on that 
5 J as far as — or are you asking for anything concerning 
6 dismissal of any other Counts? Maybe that's not an option 
7 J you have-
8 1 MR. BRADSHAW: I don't believe that is an option at 
9 I the present time. But we are going to ask the Court at the 
10 I end of probation to reduce them, and we'll be approaching the 
11 Court in that regard* 
12 THE COURT: That will be the order of the Court 
13 then. 
14 I MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Good luck to you, sir. 
16 (This concludes these Sentencing Proceedings.) 
17 I * * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
t 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I 
am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and a Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah. 
That at the time and place of the proceedings in 
the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the 
Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Homer 
F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
proceedings had therein. 
That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the 
Sentencing Proceedings were transcribed by computer into the 
foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
correct transcript of the same. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
this, the 13th day of March 1993. 
Q\>A 
Suza: intfe Warnick, €SR, RPR-CM 
My commission expires: 
1 April 1995 
770 East 200d"Couth I 
-Bountiful, U^h 84010 ! MyCiE8ra!xp | rM i ASAHS { 
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JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) AFFIDAVIT OF VICKI 
v. ) HARKER 
TOOD ALLEN PARKER, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Case No. 920732-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Vicki Harker, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the staff supervisor at the Fremont Community 
Correctional Center • I can be reached at 2588 West 2365 South, 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 or by phone at (801) 972-8651 during 
business hours. 
2 • That Todd Allen Parker was enrolled at the Fremont Center 
and classified as a Probation Environmental Structure offender from 
November 12, 1991 to July 31, 1992. 
3. That while Parker was at the center he was required to 
pay a service fee of $180 per month for his room, linen, and meals. 
This is the standard fee required (absent medical exemption) of all 
Environmental Structure offenders. 
4. That Parker was assessed service fees in the amount of 
$1548.00 for the time he spent at the Fremont center. 
5. That I am informed by Judy Sahm, office technician, who 
is also filing an affidavit in this case, that Parker has only paid 
$1146.29 leaving a balance of $401,71 owing to Fremont. 
6. That Parker received three meals a day on weekdays and 
two meals a day on weekends (brunch and dinner) while living at the 
center. 
7. That Parker received treatment while he was participating 
in the program that included group therapy sessions twice a week, 
and an individual counselor who worked closely with him to assist 
in fulfilling the program requirements. 
8. That Parker was also involved in the Granite School 
District GED program which was provided to him at the Fremont 
Center. 
9. Parker was employed, as is required of all offenders, at 
Chuck A Rama for a short period and later at Deseret Industries for 
the remainder of his residency. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1993. 
Vicki Harker 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of July, 1993 
dBPfc i 
vSSSE&yl 
*5ttfiS#" J NOTARY PUBLIC 
" 7 ? ^ CfrKrrsSLaAot*-^ **/p<«JL& i ^ ^ ' V / 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TOOD ALLEN PARKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY SAHM 
Case No. 920732-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Judy Sahm, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am an Office Technician at the Fremont Center 
located at 2588 West 2365 South in West Valley City, Utah, In July 
of 1992, when Todd Allen Parker was released from the center, I was 
in charge of billing statements and financial records• 
2. That according to our records Todd Allen Parker was 
assessed service fees in the amount of $1548.00 and he has only 
paid $1146.29 to the Fremont Center. 
3. That Parker has a balance of $401.71 still owing to the 
Fremont Center and has not made any payments since he was released 
on July 31, 1992. 
4. That the documents attached are copies of the true and 
correct records I have in my custody regarding the current status 
of Parker's account. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1993. 
.yw^. ^4-A~/-^>X-^ 
Judy Sahm 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of July, 1993 
r 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
*~?pn f * ^ yo-t^ uC^ P 9ir /t/f ^ i 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
O. Lane McCotter 
Executive Director 
Raymond H. Wahl 
Director, Field Operations 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS 
FREMONT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
2588 West 2365 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)972-8651 
PRIVATE 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
RE: 
Trina Mann 
Attorney General's Office 
State of Utah 
Vicki Harker, Supervisor 
Fremont Community Correctional Center 
July 22,1993 
Todd Allen Parker 
Todd Allen Parker entered Fremont Community Correctional Center on November 12, 
1991. He was released from this program on July 31,1992. During this period of time he 
was assesed service fees in the amount of $1548.00. He paid a total of $1146.29, leaving 
a balance of $401.71 owing to Fremont. Please refer to attached financial agreement. 
Mr. Parker was classified as a Probation Enviornmental Structure offender. He 
partictipated in group therapy two times per week and was involved in the Granite School 
District GED program which was provided to him here on center. He was provided with 
an individual counselor who worked closely with him to assist him in program 
requirements. Mr. Parker was employed, as is required of all offenders, at Chuck A Rama 
for a short period and later at Deseret Industries for the remainder of his residency. 
if there is any further information that would be helpful in this matter please feel free to 
contact me at any time. 
1 enclosure 
PRIVATE 
Norman H.Bangerter 
Governor 
GtryWDeLand 
Eieaitto Director 
James H. Gillespie Jr. 
Director. F«M Operations 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS 
FREMONT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
2588 West 2365 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801) 972-8651 
PRIVATE 
July 31, 1992 
I, Todd Allen Parker, agree to pay Fremont Community 
Correctional Center for Service Fees accrued while a resident from 
November 1991 to July 1992 in the amount of $407.71 at the rate of 
$100 per month beginning August 1992. 
Resident Signature 
WITNESS: PRIVATE 
